Sysmon Event ID 25 <ProcessTampering>

Sysmon Event ID 25: ProcessTampering — Hollowing and Herpaderping

Published

Sysmon detected a process hiding technique — Microsoft names "hollow" and "herpaderp" — against a process on the host, and records which image, which account and which process GUID it was.

Logged to: Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational, on the machine where it happened; filtered in a Sysmon configuration by the <ProcessTampering> element.

Microsoft's description

Event ID 25: ProcessTampering (Process image change)

This event is generated when process hiding techniques such as "hollow" or "herpaderp" are being detected.

Source: Microsoft's Sysmon documentation

Every field of event 25

FieldWhat it tells you
ImageThe image the tampered process was started from. Treat it as a claim rather than a fact — the point of these techniques is that the image on disk is not what is running.
TypeThe kind of tampering Sysmon reported for this process. Summarize by it over your own estate to see which kinds occur and which images produce them.
ProcessGuidIdentifies the process uniquely; the same GUID appears in its process creation (event 1), its network connections (event 3) and its process accesses (event 10).
ProcessIdThe Windows PID, for matching other telemetry from the same host and time window. PIDs are reused, so pin a match with ProcessGuid or the timestamp.
UserThe account the tampered process runs as — the context the attacker's code gained, and the identity whose other activity you should review next.
UtcTimeWhen Sysmon reported the tampering, in UTC. Anchor the surrounding process creations, image loads and connections to this moment.
RuleNameThe name of the ProcessTampering rule that matched, when the configuration tags its rules; it tells you which filter brought the event in.

Field names and order from Sysmon's manifest (schema 4.90), checked on every build.

What it records

Microsoft’s description of the event is one sentence: “This event is generated when process hiding techniques such as “hollow” or “herpaderp” are being detected.”

Both named techniques exist to make a running process look like something it is not. In image hollowing, a process is started from a legitimate executable and its mapped image is replaced before it runs, so a defender reading the process list sees a trusted name. In herpaderping, the file backing the image is changed after it has been mapped but before execution begins, so the bytes on disk that any scanner reads afterwards are not the bytes that run. In both cases the normal evidence — the image path, its hash on disk, its signature — describes the disguise rather than the payload.

Sysmon writes seven fields here, in order: RuleName, UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Type and User. There is no command line, no parent and no hash in this event: it names the affected process and the kind of tampering, and leaves the rest to the process’s other events, which share its ProcessGuid.

The event is filtered by the <ProcessTampering> element, with the usual Sysmon conditions (is, is any, contains, begin with, end with, excludes, image and the rest). Once you know which images produce the event routinely on your own healthy hosts, exclude exactly those:

<ProcessTampering onmatch="exclude">
  <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</Image>
  <Image condition="end with">\setup.exe</Image>
</ProcessTampering>

Build that list from measurement, not from a template copied off the internet — an exclusion is a blind spot, and Image is the one field an attacker chooses.

When it matters

ReadingWhat to do with it
An Image that has never produced this event in your estate beforeHighest value signal; treat as a suspected injection or hollowing (T1055, T1055.012)
A trusted system binary — svchost.exe, rundll32.exe, explorer.exe — tampered on one hostThe classic hollowing target: a trusted name carrying someone else’s code
Tampering on a process running as a service, SYSTEM or an admin account (User)Decide what that identity could reach, and review its other activity on the host
The same Image tampered on dozens of hosts within minutesUsually a deployment or a packer rollout; confirm against change records before escalating
Tampering followed within seconds by network connections or handles to lsass.exeThe payload is active — pull events 3 and 10 for the same ProcessGuid

How to investigate

Every ProcessTampering event in the last week, with the account and the reported type:

Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" and EventID == 25
| extend D = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-apply d = D on (summarize f = make_bag(bag_pack(tostring(d["@Name"]), tostring(d["#text"]))))
| extend Image = tostring(f.Image), TamperType = tostring(f.Type), Account = tostring(f.User),
         ProcessGuid = tostring(f.ProcessGuid), ProcessId = tostring(f.ProcessId), RuleName = tostring(f.RuleName)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Image, TamperType, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, RuleName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Rank the images by how rare they are across the estate — the ones at the top of this list are the ones worth a person’s time, and the ones at the bottom are your exclusion candidates:

Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" and EventID == 25
| extend D = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-apply d = D on (summarize f = make_bag(bag_pack(tostring(d["@Name"]), tostring(d["#text"]))))
| extend Image = tolower(tostring(f.Image)), TamperType = tostring(f.Type), Account = tostring(f.User)
| summarize Hosts = dcount(Computer), Events = count(), Types = make_set(TamperType, 5),
            Accounts = make_set(Account, 5), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by Image
| where Hosts <= 2
| order by LastSeen desc

Then pivot on ProcessGuid. The same GUID in the process creation event gives the command line, parent and hashes recorded at start — compare that image path with what the host holds now. The image loads show what the process pulled in afterwards, network connections show where it went, and CreateRemoteThread and process access show what it reached into; a handle to lsass.exe from a tampered process is the case covered by the LSASS access rule. On the Windows side, the matching 4688 confirms who started the process, and the 4624 records for that host tell you whose credentials were present while it ran. A Sysmon export can be run through the free log analyzer for a first pass.

Read a Sysmon log without a SIEM

Copy Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon%4Operational.evtx from C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs (or wevtutil epl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational sysmon.evtx) and open it in the EVTX viewer: every event in a table, event 25 filterable, with the analyzer's checks for LSASS access, remote threads and suspicious command lines. Nothing is uploaded.

Related events

Detect it

MITRE ATT&CK: T1055T1055.012

Frequently Asked Questions

What does Sysmon Event ID 25 actually detect?
Microsoft's description is short and specific - "This event is generated when process hiding techniques such as 'hollow' or 'herpaderp' are being detected." It reports that a process on the host was subjected to such a technique; it does not tell you which code ended up running inside it, so you have to reconstruct that from the process's other events.
Is every ProcessTampering event malicious?
No. Programs that unpack, rewrite or otherwise modify their own image as they start can also surface here, so the first job on a new deployment is to list which Image values produce the event routinely on healthy hosts and build the exclude list from that before anyone is paged on it.
How do I find out what a hollowed process did?
Take the ProcessGuid from the event and pivot to the same GUID in the other Sysmon events - event 1 for the command line, parent and hashes, event 7 for what it loaded, event 3 for where it connected and event 10 for the processes it opened. The ProcessTampering event names the victim; those events show the behaviour.
Which configuration element controls Sysmon Event ID 25?
The <ProcessTampering> element. Like the other Sysmon filters it takes onmatch="include" or onmatch="exclude" and conditions such as is, is any, contains, begin with, end with and image, applied to the fields of the event - most usefully Image.

Find every Sysmon 25 that matters

Open a Sysmon .evtx or XML export in the free browser analyzer: LSASS access, remote thread injection, process tampering, suspicious command lines and reverse-shell ports are flagged, with the events behind each. Nothing is uploaded.

Investigating something right now? LogTriage checks every address in the file against threat intelligence and writes the incident report: 10 analyses a month free. The incident pack adds the in-depth AI analysis and files up to 100 MB: 25 analyses for $19, one payment, no subscription. Pricing

How this page was made. The official definitions, field names and examples on it are copied by script from the sources it links and re-checked against them on every build. The investigation advice was drafted with AI from those sources and passed a separate review before publishing. What is checked, and how · found a mistake? [email protected]