HIGH GitHub Audit Log MFA Bypass / Conditional Access Evasion LTR-0014 ✓ validated

Detect Two-Factor Authentication Being Disabled in GitHub Audit Logs

Published · Updated

MITRE ATT&CK: T1556.006

Sigma Rule

title: GitHub Two-Factor Authentication Disabled
id: 9e2f7b58-4c31-42a6-b7d9-05e8a1c36f4d
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects two-factor authentication being removed in GitHub: the organization's
  two-factor requirement disabled (org.disable_two_factor_requirement, in the
  organization audit log) or two-factor authentication disabled for a user
  account (two_factor_authentication.disabled, in enterprise audit logs and the
  user's security log). Either makes a stolen password enough to sign in.
references:
  - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/audit-log-events-for-your-organization
  - https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/security-log-events
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/
author: LogTriage
date: 2026/08/04
modified: 2026/10/20
logsource:
  product: github
  service: audit
detection:
  two_factor_removed:
    action:
      - 'org.disable_two_factor_requirement'
      - 'two_factor_authentication.disabled'
  condition: two_factor_removed
falsepositives:
  - Planned organization two-factor policy change (correlate with a ticket)
  - A user moving two-factor authentication to a new device
level: high
tags:
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1556.006
How the rule decides

1 · Each event is compared with one selection. Every field in a selection must match; listed values are alternatives.

two_factor_removed
  • action is any of org.disable_two_factor_requirementtwo_factor_authentication.disabled

2 · An event counts when

two_factor_removed

Alert high Checked on every deploy: fires on github_audit_attack.json, silent on github_audit_normal.json — both in the public sample dataset ↗︎

What this rule detects

A GitHub organization takeover follows a consistent pattern: keep access, get the source out and make recovery hard. This rule targets the step that makes access stick, removing two-factor authentication:

  • org.disable_two_factor_requirement: the organization no longer requires two-factor authentication from its members.
  • two_factor_authentication.disabled: two-factor authentication was disabled for a user account.

After either, a password alone opens the account.

Detection logic

A single selection on the action field with both values; one occurrence fires the rule. The other takeover steps are deliberately not part of this rule. Adding a member (org.add_member) and creating a webhook (hook.create) are routine one by one and only suspicious in combination, which needs a correlation rule. Destroying a repository (repo.destroy) is a separate, destructive behavior with its own response.

Validated against a real sample

Validated against github_audit_attack.json (shipped with LogTriage), four actions by the actor attacker-bot within three minutes:

  • repo.destroy of corp-org/critical-infra from 185.220.101.42
  • two_factor_authentication.disabled from the same address
  • org.add_member adding new-backdoor-account, now from 45.142.212.100
  • hook.create on corp-org/main-app from the same second address

The rule fires on the two-factor event. The other three are the context that turns it into an incident: correlate by actor and you see one account removing its own two-factor authentication, adding a backdoor member and planting a webhook. It stays silent on the matching benign log (repo.create, team.add_repository and protected_branch.create).

False positives

Two-factor policy changes during a migration should be planned, ticketed and performed by a known owner. A user who disables two-factor authentication to move it to a new device turns it back on within minutes; correlate with the matching enable event before escalating.

Frequently Asked Questions

Which two actions does the rule use, and where do they appear?
`org.disable_two_factor_requirement` is in the organization audit log; GitHub describes it as "A two-factor authentication requirement was disabled for the organization." `two_factor_authentication.disabled` is logged when two-factor authentication is disabled for a user account; it appears in enterprise audit logs and in the user's own security log. The first weakens every account in the organization at once; the second removes the protection from one account, often the one the attacker already controls.
Why is disabling two-factor authentication worth an alert on its own?
Because it has almost no routine use and a clear attacker motive. With two-factor authentication gone, a stolen or reset password is all anyone needs, and access survives the next credential reset. Legitimate changes to the organization policy are planned and announced, and a user moving to a new device re-enables it within minutes.
The sample also adds a member, plants a webhook and destroys a repository. Why doesn't this rule fire on those?
Because each needs a different design. Adding members and creating webhooks are routine on their own and only become suspicious together, from the same actor, in a short window, which a single-event Sigma rule cannot express; it needs a Sigma correlation rule. Repository deletion (`repo.destroy`) is destructive rather than a takeover step, with its own response, so it deserves its own rule.
How do I get these events into a SIEM?
Organization owners can stream the audit log from GitHub Enterprise Cloud to a SIEM, or poll the audit log REST API. Make sure the stream includes the organization's own events and, for enterprise accounts, the enterprise audit log, since that is where user-level two-factor changes appear.

Related Resources

Reference

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